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FAMILY EXCLUSION CLAUSES: WHATEVER
HAPPENED TO THE ABROGATION OF
INTRAFAMILY IMMUNITY?
Since the abrogation of intrafamily tort immunities, insurance
companies in California have inserted exclusionary provisions into
their automobile and homeowner policies which preclude indem-
nity where one family member negligently injures another. These
provisions, known as family exclusion clauses, are specifically au-
thorized in automobile policies by statute, however, legislative jus-
tification for such exclusions is lacking for homeowner policies.
This Comment argues that family exclusion clauses should be
eliminated in both automobile and homeowner policies because the
clauses violate well-settled tort principles, as well as public policy,
as pronounced by the California Supreme Court.
INTRODUCTION
This Comment addresses the widespread use of family exclusion
clauses in automobile and homeowner insurance policies in Califor-
nia. Typically, insurance agencies purport to offer comprehensive lia-
bility coverage to their customers, often through broad provisions in
automobile and homeowner insurance policies.' However, almost
every insurance policy issued in California contains several exclu-
sionary provisions which drastically reduce actual coverage.'
One such provision is generally referred to as the family exclusion
clause. This clause excludes liability coverage where one family
member is injured by the tortious conduct of another. This Comment
focuses on the inconsistency between family exclusion clauses and
the California Supreme Court's abrogation of intrafamily tort immu-
nity. Family exclusions directly contravene well-settled principles of
1. The typical automobile or homeowner insurance policy states the insurer
"agrees to pay on behalf of the Insured all sums which the Insured shall become legally
obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury . .. " State Farm Fire & Casu-
alty Co. v. Alstadt, 113 Cal. App. 3d 33, 36, 169 Cal. Rptr. 593, 594 (1980) (emphasis
added).
2. E.g., Schwalbe v. Jones, 16 Cal. 3d 514, 521 n.9, 546 P.2d 1033, 1038 n.9, 128
Cal. Rptr. 321, 326 n.9 (1976) (judicial notice taken that family exclusion clauses ap-
pear in virtually every automobile insurance policy issued in California); Mutual of
Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Wiscomb, 97 Wash. 2d 203, 643 P.2d 441, 445 (1982) (prevalence
of family exclusion clauses in that state).
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tort law and public policy in California.3 Furthermore, these uncon-
scionable provisions reflect a bad faith effort by insurance companies
to misrepresent policy benefits to unwary and unsophisticated
consumers.
4
This Comment urges the California Supreme Court to reconsider
its unequivocal holdings abolishing intrafamily immunity, and de-
clare family exclusionary clauses in homeowner policies void as
against public policy. These provisions can be struck down under
sound judicial principles of adhesion contract such as unconsciona-
bility, as they apply to insurance policies. Additionally, this author
suggests the California legislature prohibit family exclusion clauses
in automobile policies by eliminating specific sections of the insur-
ance code which permit these unsavory provisions.
FAMILY EXCLUSION CLAUSES
Family exclusion clauses appear in virtually every automobile and
homeowner insurance policy issued in California.5 The clauses ex-
clude indemnity for bodily injury sustained by an "insured," or any
relative who resides in the same household." Most policies define "in-
sured" to include not only the named insured, but their spouse and
children as well. 7 Consequently, insurance indemnity does not exist
3. The California Supreme Court has repeatedly pursued the goals of loss distribu-
tion and compensation through a scheme of social insurance in tort law. See Levy &
Ursin, Tort Law in California: At the Crossroads, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 497 (1979). These
principles were used by the California Supreme Court in abrogating intrafamily immu-
nity. However, the insurance industry continues to avoid indemnity in intrafamily torts
through the use of family exclusion clauses. As noted by Levy & Ursin: "The insurance
industry, . . . has attempted to reestablish these [intrafamily] immunities by including
family exclusion* clauses in liability insurance policies. Such clauses exclude from cover-
age members of the insured's family, and have the practical effect of reviving through
contract the tort immunities abrogated by the court." Id. at 505 n.49.
4. The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing dictates that the insurer
must protect the insured's interest, as much as its own. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins.
Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 818-19, 598 P.2d 452, 456, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482, 486 (1979) cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 912 (1980). Moreover, carriers must refrain from acts which injure the
insured's rights to receive policy benefits. Id. at 818, 598 P.2d at 456, 157 Cal. Rptr. at
486. Extensive California case law exists regarding the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, however, this Comment will not examine these cases. Nevertheless, this
doctrine may provide a means for courts to invalidate family exclusionary clauses and
impose liability on carriers. See notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
5. See supra note 2.
6. A typical provision reads as follows: "THIS INSURANCE DOES NOT AP-
PLY UNDER: Coverage A, bodily injury to any insured or member of the family of an
insured residing in the same household as the insured." See, e.g., Farmers Ins. Exch. v.
Cocking, 29 Cal. 3d 383, 386, 628 P.2d 1, 2, 173 Cal. Rptr..846, 847 (1981); State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Alstadt, 113 Cal. App. 3d 33, 35-38, 169 Cal. Rptr. 593, 594-95
(1980); Meritplan Ins. Co. v. Woollum, 52 Cal. App. 3d 167, 169-70, 123 Cal. Rptr.
613, 615 (1975) (examples of typical exclusion clause language).
7. See cases cited supra note 6 for typical policy definitions of "insured." An ex-
ample is "(a) 'Insured' means (1) the named insured stated in the declarations of this
policy; (2) if residents of the Named Insured's household, his spouse, the relatives of
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when one family member is injured through another family mem-
ber's negligence. As a result, compensation is often denied in an in-
trafamily tort.8
LEGISLATIVE AUTHORIZATION IN AUTOMOBILE POLICIES
California Insurance Code section 11580.1 permits certain exclu-
sionary clauses in automobile policies.9 Pursuant to this statute, a
carrier may exclude indemnity for bodily injury to any insured in an
automobile policy. 10 Moreover, the legislature has specifically noted
that the Insurance Code represents the exclusive public policy in
California pertaining to automobile insurance."' Refusing to invali-
date family exclusion clauses in automobile policies, courts have con-
sistently cited this statute for its expression of legislative intent.
12
Despite statutory authorization, family exclusion clauses violate
the mandate of California judicially created public policy and tort
reform. 3 To permit family exclusion clauses after the abolition of
intrafamily immunity is inconsistent. California Insurance Code sec-
tion 11580.1 permits insurance companies to revive the archaic doc-
trine of intrafamily immunity and burdens innocent tort victims.
14
Unlike automobile insurance, family exclusion clauses are without
either, and any other person under the age of twenty-one in the case of any Insured
...." State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Alstadt, 113 Cal. App. 3d 33, 37, 169 Cal.
Rptr. 593, 594 (1980).
8. See infra note 27 and accompanying text (intrafamily tort suit usually not
brought unless there is liability insurance).
9. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.1 (West 1983).
10. "In addition to any exclusion as provided in paragraph (3) of subdivision (b),
the insurance afforded by any such policy of automobile liability insurance ... may, by
appropriate policy provision, be made inapplicable to any or all of the following . . .(5)
Liability for bodily injury to an insured ..... CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.1(c)(West
1983).
11. The Legislature declares that the public policy of this state in regard to
provisions authorized or required to be included in policies affording automobile
liability insurance or motor vehicle liability insurance issued or delivered in this
state shall be as stated in this article, that this article expresses the total public
policy of this state respecting the contents of such policies . .
CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.05 (West 1977).
12. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Cocking, 29 Cal. 3d at 386-87, 628 P.2d at 2, 173 Cal.
Rptr. at 847-48; Meritplan Ins. Co. v. Woollum, 52 Cal. App. 3d at 174-76, 123 Cal.
Rptr. at 618-19.
13. See generally Levy & Ursin, supra note 3 (discussion of tort reform in
California).
14. In comparison, Michigan has abrogated family exclusion clauses in automobile
policies, deeming them void as against public policy. E.g. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Sivey, 404 Mich. 59, 272 N.W.2d 55 (1978). Other jurisdictions have also elimi-
nated family exclusion clauses as being against public policy. E.g., Mutual of Enumclaw
Ins. Co. v. Wiscomb, 97 Wash. 2d 203, 643 P.2d 441 (1982).
specific statutory authorization in homeowner policies. Therefore, the
courts should apply the public policy which favors compensation for
all injured persons and abrogate these clauses in this context. 5
CALIFORNIA'S PUBLIC POLICY AND FAMILY EXCLUSION CLAUSES
Intrafamily exclusion clauses contravene judicial tort policy in
California, because the California Supreme Court has unequivocally
eliminated intrafamily immunities to negligence liability and has
permitted compensation for intrafamily tort victims.' 6 Spousal im-
munity for both negligent and intentional torts was abandoned by
the California Supreme Court in 1962.17 Parental immunity was
later abolished by the same court in 1971.18
The fundamental policy and motivation for the abolition of in-
trafamily tort immunity was to provide compensation for those per-
sons injured by the tortious conduct of others. As the court recog-
nized in Self v. Self'
[T]he general. rule is and should be that, in the absence of statute or some
compelling reason of public policy, where there is negligence proximately
causing an injury, there should be liability. Immunity exists only by statute
or by reason of compelling dictates of public policy. Neither exists [in the
case of intratamily torts].
20
Self and other decisions demonstrate a fundamental concern with
compensation for accident victims, rather than mere abstract notions
of liability. In fact, compensation has become the basic goal of Cali-
fornia tort law. In Jess v. Herrmann,21 a case involving the question
of whether there should be a set-off of plaintiffs and defendant's
recoveries where there is comparative negligence, the California Su-
15. See supra note 3. See also Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Teachers Ins. Co., 101 Cal.
App. 3d 804, 805, 809, 161 Cal. Rptr. 738, 739-40 (1980) ("Public policy does not
permit an automobile liability insurance carrier to exclude coverage for bodily injuries
sustained by a person solely because claimant is a relative of an insured."); Mutual of
Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Wiscomb, 97 Wash. 2d 203, 643 P.2d 441, 446 (1982) ("Under
any circumstances exclusion clauses which purport to deny coverage to children of the
insured or any person not a party to the insurance contract are violative of this state's
public policy."). But see State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Clendening, 197 Cal. Rptr.
377 (1983) (family exclusion clauses do not violate public policy).
16. Intrafamily immunity was judicially created and barred family members from
suing one another for both negligent and intentional torts. E.g., Trudell v. Leatherby,
212 Cal. 678, 300 P. 7 (1931); Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 103 P. 219 (1909).
17. Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d 65, 26 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1962) (spousal
immunity abolished for intentional torts); Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26
Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962) (spousal immunity abolished for negligence torts).
18. Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971).
19. 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d 65, 26 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1962).
20. Id. at 689, 376 P.2d at 69, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
21. Jess v. Herrmann, 26 Cal. 3d 131, 143, 604 P.2d 208, 215, 161 Cal. Rptr. 87,
94 (1979) (a setoff case showing concern for recovery). The state of Washington has also
focused upon guaranteeing compensation to tort victims. E.g., Mutual of Enumclaw Ins.
Co. v. Wiscomb, 97 Wash. 2d 203, 643 P.2d 441, 446 (1982) (family exclusion clauses
invalidated for violating state's public policy of assuring compensation).
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preme Court emphasized its concern for the injured parties' "ulti-
mate financial recovery."
However, intrafamily exclusion clauses have virtually eliminated
the effect of these decisions. The availability of liability insurance
was crucial to the abrogation of intrafamily immunity because insur-
ance provides a reliable source of compensation for tort victims.2 2 In
abolishing negligence immunities and promoting the goals of loss dis-
tribution and compensation, the California Supreme Court has con-
sistently emphasized and relied upon the critical role insurance plays
in modern society.23 Following the lead of Chief Justice Traynor, the
court premised over twenty years of tort reform upon the recognition
that liability insurance was prevalent in modern society.24
Indeed, the prevalence of insurance was an important basis for the
California Supreme Court's abrogation of intrafamily immunity. In
22. 26 Cal. 3d 131, 604 P.2d 215, 161 Cal. Rptr. 87. See Levy & Ursin, supra
note 3 at 497-545. Cf. "The purpose of liability insurance is not only to protect the
insured against the adverse impact of liability but to assure that the victim be actually
compensated for his tort loss instead of having merely an empty claim against a judg-
ment-proof defendant. . . ." Fleming, Report to the Joint Committee of the California
Legislature on Tort Liability on the Problems Associated with American Motorcycle
Ass'n v. Superior Court, 30 HASTINGS L. J. 1464, 1470 (1979) (emphasis added).
23. Levy & Ursin, supra note 3, at 500; 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF
TORTS §§ 13.1-13.7 (1956). See Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 859, 506 P.2d 212, 215,
106 Cal. Rptr. 388, 391 (1973) (automobile guest statute eliminated as it "completely
ignores the prevalence of liability insurance. . . ."); Jess v. Herrmann, 26 Cal. 3d 131,
135, 604 P.2d 208, 209, 161 Cal. Rptr. 87, 88 ("[G]eneral principles of equity and com-
mon sense dictate that California courts not blind themselves to the realistic status of the
parties vis-a-vis insurance.").
24. Levy & Ursin, supra note 3, at 500. Chief Justice Traynor recognized the
existence of insurance as crucial to assessing tort liability and its equitable effect of
spreading the loss or cost of an injury throughout the public sector, rather than casting it
solely upon the injured victim: "The cost of an injury and loss of time or health may be
an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of
injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of
doing business." Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436,
441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring opinion). See also Traynor, The Ways and Means of
Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 366 (1965). The exis-
tence of insurance has been repeatedly cited by the California Supreme Court when ex-
panding liability to provide compensation to a greater number of tort victims. Abolishing
rules which immunized land owners from negligence liability in Rowland v. Christian, 69
Cal. 2d 108, 117, 443 P.2d 561, 567, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 103 (1968), the court noted the
"prevalence and availability of insurance" as the primary source to enhance loss distribu-
tion and compensation. -This opinion was later approved by Judge Bazelon, who recog-
nized that contemporary developments in tort law were related, in part, to the availabil-
ity of insurance; "[T]here is a continual movement away from fault as the governing
principle for allocation of losses, in favor of enterprise liability or the distribution of
losses over a larger segment of society through insurance." Smith v. Arbaugh's Restau-
rant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (emphasis in original).
Gibson v. Gibson,25 the court focused upon the critical role of insur-
ance in eliminating parental immunity:
[W]e feel we that cannot overlook the widespread prevalence of liability
insurance and its practical effect on intrafamily suits. Although it is obvious
that insurance does not create liability where none otherwise exists (citation
omitted), it is unrealistic to ignore this factor in making an informed policy
decision on whether to abolish parental negligence immunity.2"
The availability of insurance is particularly significant in in-
trafamily tort claims. In fact, the California Supreme Court has rec-
ognized that "virtually no [intrafamily personal injury] suits are
brought except where there is insurance. "27
Only where the family member tortfeasor is insured is it feasible
for an injured family member to bring suit against the negligent rel-
ative and recover adequate compensation.28 Absent insurance, a
judgment in an intrafamily personal injury suit would generally re-
sult in a mere redistribution of family assets, rather than providing
any measurable recovery to the injured party. Indeed, without insur-
ance, the suit, if brought at all, would undoubtedly result in a net
loss in overall family assets due to the attorneys' fees and other liti-
gation expenses.
Family exclusion clauses render the abrogation of intrafamily im-
munity illusory and cast the entire cost of an injury upon the victim.
These exclusion clauses enable insurance companies to circumvent
the public policy of providing compensation for injured family mem-
bers, which was the primary basis for eliminating intrafamily immu-
nity.29 By denying indemnity for the negligence of an insured against
another family member, the insurance industry destroys what was
achieved through the abrogation of intrafamily immunity.30
Furthermore, including intrafamily exclusion clauses in insurance
policies may not be justified as a legitimate insurance underwriting
practice. These exclusions are directed at a specific category of vic-
25. 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971).
26. Id. 3 Cal. 3d at 922, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
27. 3 Cal. 3d at 922, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293 (citing James, Acci-
dent Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L. J. 549, 553
(1948)).
28. Id.
29. See supra, note 19 and accompanying text. See also 3 Cal. 3d at 922, 479 P.2d
at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293; ("public policy compels liability, not immunity.").
30. Insurance companies assert that family exclusion clauses have no effect on in-
trafamily immunity. E.g. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Cocking, 29 Cal. 3d 383, 388, 173 Cal.
Rptr. 846, 848 (1981) (an injured party "retains the full unrestricted right to sue the
negligent insured. (approving Meritplan Ins. Co. v. Woollum, 52 Cal. App. 3d 167, 123
Cal. Rptr. 613 (1975)). The exclusion affects only the right to reach insurance proceeds
for the satisfaction of any judgment obtained."). This view fails to consider two impor-
tant points. First, the prevalence of insurance was crucial to the court's abrogation of
intrafamily immunity. E.g., Gibson v. Gibson 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr.
288. Additionally, without insurance, intrafamily suits are generally abandoned. Id. at
922, 479 P.2d at 563, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293. See also James, supra note 26, at 553.
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tims, rather than toward a particular type of risk or category of
tortfeasor. Few sound reasons exist for these policy provisions despite
insurance industry claims.31 In short, from a policy standpoint, fam-
ily exclusion clauses are irrational.32
Moreover, family exclusion clauses affect persons who are not par-
ties to the insurance contract. Children, invalids, spouses, and other
family members are defined as "insureds," and, thus, are excluded
from coverage for their injuries.33
SUPPORT FOR FAMILY EXCLUSION CLAUSES LACKS MERIT
Currently, there is no justification other than self-serving interests
of the insurance industry which supports family exclusion clauses.
However, the insurance industry has advanced several arguments to
support these clauses. Nevertheless, California courts have unequivo-
cally rejected these arguments in abrogating intrafamily immunity.34
An early justification for intrafamily immunity was the claim that
31. The insurance industry has advanced many arguments in favor of family exclu-
sion clauses, asserting that family exclusion clauses protect family harmony, and reduce
the amount of fraudulent or collusive suits. It is difficult to understand how denying
compensation for injury caused by another family member promotes family harmony
when the compensatory funds come from the insurer, not the family member. These
same points were rejected by the Gibson court in eliminating family immunity. 3 Cal. 3d
at 919-20, 479 P.2d at 651-52, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 291-92.
32. Compensation has become the fundamental goal of California tort law. The
California cases in which many common law barriers to recovery were eliminated provide
an excellent example of the concern for compensation. See Levy & Ursin, supra note 3,
at 497-545 for a discussion of cases abolishing immunities. Other legal scholars have also
recognized and supported this trend. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 22 at 1069:
"[I]n accident cases we believe compensation and some form of social insurance (like
workmen's compensation) to be desirable and that until that can be had, every aspect of
the present system which produces some of the benefits of social insurance should be
fostered .... "
33. See, e.g., Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Cocking, 29 Cal. 3d 383, 386, 173 Cal. Rptr.
846, 847 (1981); Meritplan Ins. Co. v. Woollum, 52 Cal. App. 3d 167, 169-70, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 613, 615 (1975) (examples of the typical language used to exclude all family mem-
bers). See also Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Wiscomb, 97 Wash. 2d 203, 643 P.2d
441, 445 (1982) (family exclusion clauses affect third parties outside the contractual
negotiations). For the same reasons that family exclusions are void as against public
policy, those exclusion clauses which deny indemnity to any "named insured" are also
void. Whether the exclusion applies to other family members (usually children) or to any
named insured (generally husband and wife as joint tenants) the provision violates public
policy. See, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288
(1971); Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962); Self v.
Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d 65, 26 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1962).
34. See, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288
(1971); Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962); Self v.
Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d 65, 26 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1962); Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d
421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955).
suits among family members would threaten intrafamily harmony. 5
In Trudell v. Leatherby,36 an unemancipated minor child was denied
a negligence action against his parent. The court stated that a suit
would "bring discord into the family and disrupt the peace and har-
mony of the household.
'37
Contemporary courts, however, have thoroughly rejected the fam-
ily discord argument.38 The Gibson court stated: "If this rationale
ever had any validity, it has none today."' 9 In fact, the court recog-
nized that in situations where insurance exists, the threat to family
harmony is drastically reduced, if not extinguished: "[T]he risk of
family discord is much less in negligence actions, where an adverse
judgment will normally be satisfied by the defendant family mem-
ber's insurance carrier, than in property actions, where it will gener-
ally be paid out of the defendant's pocket.
'40
Additionally, in the case of Self v. Self, the California Supreme
Court classified the family discord argument as "illogical and un-
sound.""" Actually, the lack of coverage, rather than compensation
through insurance, promotes family disharmony.4 2 As the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court noted in abolishing intrafamily immunity in
Pennsylvania:
Denial of the action may itself promote marital discord by causing the hus-
band and wife to pay expenses that otherwise would be paid for by insur-
ance (citation omitted). Since the very purpose of liability insurance is com-
pensation, its presence argues in favor of permitting an injured individual to
establish the liability of his or her tortfeasor-spouse. 43
The family harmony theory is also meritless because where an in-
trafamily tort is involved, conflict would already exist, if it existed at
all. As Prosser notes: "This [the family discord argument] is on the
bald theory that after the husband has beaten his wife, there is a
state of peace and harmony left to be disturbed . . . ." In short, the
family discord argument does not justify denying insurance coverage
for intrafamily torts.
Insurance companies have also attempted to justify family exclu-
sion clauses by claiming they must protect themselves from fraudu-
35. Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 919, 479 P.2d 648, 651, 92 Cal. Rptr. 291
(1971).
36. 212 Cal. 678, 300 P. 7 (1931).
37. 212 Cal. at 680, 300 P. at 8.
38. E.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971).
39. Id. at 915, 479 P.2d at 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
40. Id. at 919, 479 P.2d at 651, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 291.
41. Id. at 919, 479 P.2d at 651, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 291 (citing Self v. Self, 58 Cal.
2d 683, 690, 376 P.2d 65, 69, 26 Cal. Rptr. 97, 101 (1962)).
42. Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 920, 479 P.2d 648, 652, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288,
292 (1971) (citing W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 116 (3d ed. 1964): "domestic harmony
will not be disturbed so much by allowing the action as by denying it.").
43. Hack v. Hack, 495 Pa. 2d 314, 433 A.2d 859, 866 (1981).
44. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 122 at 863 (4th ed. 1971).
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lent and collusive lawsuits. This assertion is without merit. Undoubt-
edly, some claims are suspect. Nevertheless, as the California
Supreme Court noted in Klein v. Klein:
45
The possibility of fraud or perjury exists to some degree in all cases. But we
do not deny a cause of action to a party because of such a danger.
It would be a sad commentary on the law if we were to admit that the
judicial processes are so ineffective that we must deny relief to a person
otherwise entitled simply because in some future case a litigant may be
guilty of fraud or collusion. Once that concept were accepted, then all
causes of actions should be abolished. Our legal system is not that
ineffectual.
46
In fact, California courts have repeatedly stated that the mere
threat of fraud or collusion in future suits does not justify denying an
entire class of legitimate claims.4
Moreover, the family discord and fraud/collusion arguments are
logically inconsistent .4  The collusion problem assumes that a per-
sonal injury suit is actually targeted at the insurance carrier, rather
than the defendant family member. On the other hand, where family
discord might exist, collusion seems unlikely. The two threats cannot
coexist.
Family exclusion clauses in homeowner and automobile insurance
policies lack any legitimate basis.49 These unjustifiable and self-serv-
ing exclusions should not be allowed to subvert California's public
policy of compensation for tort victims. Essentially, the only group
which benefits from these clauses is the insurance industry, while the
45. 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962).
46. Id. at 695-96, 376 P.2d at 72-73, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 104-05.
47. E.g., Id. at 696, 376 P.2d at 73, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 105; Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal.
3d 914, 920, 479 P.2d 648, 652, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 291-92. See also Report of the
American Bar Association Special Committee on Automobile Accident Reparations 85-
86 (the threat of fraud and collusion is always a possibility, but is outweighed by the
desirability of compensating those injured). See also Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v.
Wiscomb, 97 Wash. 2d 203, 643 P.2d 441 (1982) (family exclusion clause voided in light
of public policy). Regarding the fraud and collusion argument, the court stated: "This
argument is wholly unpersuasive because the exclusion far exceeds the evil which it is
designed to protect against; collusion and fraud are the exception rather than the rule."
Id. 643 P.2d at 444.
48. Hack v. Hack, 495 Pa. 2d 314, 433 A.2d 859, 866 (1981) (the collusion argu-
ment is analytically inconsistent with the claim of family discord, and is "wholly
speculative").
49. Admittedly, California Insurance Code section 11580.1 (West Supp. 1983)
specifically authorizes family exclusion clauses in automobile insurance policies. How-
ever, these exclusions are inconsistent with California tort principles. See supra note 3.
This section also contravenes the policy of compensation for accident victims exemplified
in Financial Responsibility Laws, CAL. VEH. CODE section 16000-16560 (West 1971 &
Supp. 1983).
unwary and unsophisticated consumer receives nothing.
REMEDIES To ELIMINATE FAMILY EXCLUSION CLAUSES
Because the Legislature has permitted certain family exclusion
clauses in automobile insurance policies, that governmental body
must act before these provisions can be eliminated. Specifically, the
Legislature could modify California Insurance Code section 11580.1,
and declare family exclusion clauses in automobile policies void.
Hopefully, if this were to occur, the courts would support such an
effort.
However, the California Supreme Court can abrogate family ex-
clusion clauses in homeowner policies without legislative assistance.
Several principles of contract law applicable to insurance policies
may be used by the courts to eliminate intrafamily exclusions.
Family exclusion clauses can be abolished under doctrines of con-
tract law relating to adhesion contracts such as unconscionability
and ambiguity. Most insurance policies are adhesionary, as a matter
of law.50 These policies represent the standard form contract drafted
by insurance company attorneys, and are offered on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis.51 In fact, many insurance companies do not offer a
homeowner or automobile insurance policy without the family exclu-
sion clauses.5 2 Hence, parties are unable to avoid the harsh and un-
just effect of family exclusion clauses imposed by the insurance in-
dustry through adhesion contracts.53
The doctrine of unconscionability provides an excellent basis for
abrogating family exclusion clauses in homeowner policies. Califor-
50. E.g., Hays v. Pacific Indem., 8 Cal. App. 3d 158, 162, 86 Cal. Rptr. 815, 818
(1970) ("The insurance contract is a contract of adhesion . . . ."). Adhesion contracts
exist where an agreement is entered into between two parties of unequal bargaining
strength, using a standardized form drafted by the stronger party who dictates the terms,
and offered to the weaker party on a take it or leave it basis. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65
Cal. 2d 263, 269, 419 P.2d 168, 171, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 107 (1966).
51. See Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Wiscomb, 97 Wash. 2d 203, 643 P.2d
441, 446 (1982) (court notes there is "no freedom of contract" when a party is unable to
obtain a policy without the family exclusion clause).
52. See supra note 2.
53. The Cocking court argued, however, that family exclusion clauses are not void
since the insurer and insured can bargain for various kinds of liability insurance. Farmers
Ins. Exch. v. Cocking, 29 Cal. 3d 383, 389-91, 173 Cal. Rptr. 846, 849-50 (1981). This
viewpoint is erroneous, since parties are usually unable to avoid the family exclusion
clause. See, e.g., Schwalbe v. Jones, 16 Cal. 3d 514, 521 n. 9, 546 P.2d 1033, 1038, 128
Cal. Rptr. 321, 326. See also Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Wiscomb, in which the
court indicates that:
[T]o say there was freedom of contract in these cases is to ignore reality. A
number of insurers in this state will not sell a policy without the family or
household exclusion. . . . The contract analysis might be persuasive if this were
a coverage that one could choose to purchase or not purchase from each insurer.
The present arrangement, however, is a take-it-or-leave-it proposition.
97 Wash. 2d 203, 643 P.2d 441, 445 (1982).
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nia Civil Code section 1670.5 empowers trial courts to find as a mat-
ter of law that a clause in a contract is unconscionable and thus
unenforceable. 54 Additionally, this statute applies to all contracts, so
it may be used to invalidate family exclusion clauses in insurance
policies.55 Under this statute, evidence concerning the "commercial
setting, purpose, and effect" of the disputed provision may be
presented to prove unconscionability.56
California Civil Code section 1670.5 and the doctrine of uncon-
scionability were applied in A&M Produce Co. v. FMC Corpora-
tion.5" The court held that oppression and surprise are the two fac-
tors constituting unconscionability. 58 In general, oppression rep-
resents unequal bargaining power, where the contract is between two
parties, one of whom lacks any meaningful choice as to its terms.59
Surprise occurs where one party, such as an insurance company, uses
a standard form contract to unexpectedly or unreasonably allocate
the risks involved in the agreement.60
Family exclusion clauses appear to satisfy the necessary elements
of unconscionability. Oppression exists since, as previously men-
tioned, many carriers refuse to offer a liability insurance policy with-
out this exclusion.61 Furthermore, surprise occurs since the unwary
consumer does not expect a family exclusion clause when purchasing
a comprehensive liability policy.62 Moreover, carriers use family ex-
clusion clauses to shift the entire risk of injury to the insured, which
appears quite unreasonable, 3 and directly contravenes a primary
54. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5 (West 1983).
55. Id.
56. Id. § 1670.5(b).
57. 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 485-87, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 121-22 (1982) (disclaimer
of warranty and exclusion of consequential damages in seller's form contract declared
unconscionable). "Unconscionability is a flexible doctrine designed to allow courts to di-
rectly consider numerous factors which may adulterate the contractual process." Id. at
484, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 120.
58. Id. at 486, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
59. "'Oppression' arises from an inequality of bargaining power which results in
no real negotiation and 'an absence of meaningful choice.'" Id. (citations omitted).
60. "'Surprise' involves the extent to which the supposedly agreed-upon terms of
the bargain are hidden in a prolix printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce
the disputed terms. Characteristically, the form contract is drafted by the party with the
superior bargaining position." Id. (citations omitted).
61. See supra note 53.
62. See infra notes 72, 73 and accompanying text.
63. See A & M Produce Co. in which the court said:
[A] contract is largely an allocation of risks between the parties, and therefore
. ..a contractual term is substantively suspect if it reallocates the risks of the
bargain in an objectively unreasonable or unexpected manner. [T]he greater the
unfair surprise or inequality of bargaining power, the less unreasonable the risk
promise of the insurer-indemnity.64
Another area of adhesion contract law which might be used
against family exclusion clauses is ambiguity. In interpreting adhe-
sionary insurance contracts, the general rule in California is that any
ambiguity will be resolved against the draftsperson.6 5
In California cases involving family exclusion clauses, insureds
have attempted to use this rule of construction to avoid the exclusion
provisions.66 However, the courts have rejected this argument, usu-
ally holding that family exclusion clauses are unambiguous.
67
Admittedly, such clauses seem unambiguous, but this position is in
stark contrast with the reality of insurance marketing. As California
courts have noted, few customers actually know of or understand the
provisions contained in their insurance policy. 8 Additionally, family
exclusion clauses directly contravene the broad provision in automo-
bile and homeowner policies which states the insurer will pay all
sums the insured is held liable for due to bodily injury.69
Moreover, California courts have declared that exclusionary
clauses in insurance policies must provide notice of non-coverage in
language which is "conspicuous, plain, and clear." 70 Determining
reallocation which will be tolerated.
135 Cal. App. 3d at 487, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 122 (citations omitted).
64. See Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 272, 419 P.2d 168, 173, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 104, 109 (1966).
65. Id., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 269, 419 P.2d 168, 171, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 107; Steven v.
Fidelity & Casualty Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 868, 377 P.2d 284, 288, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172, 176
(1962). See also Continental Casualty Co. v. Phoenix Constr., 46 Cal. 2d 423, 437-38,
296 P.2d 801, 809-10 (1956):
It is elementary in insurance law that any ambiguity or uncertainty in an insur-
ance policy is to be resolved against the insurer. If semantically permissible, the
contract will be given such construction as will fairly achieve its object of secur-
ing indemnity to the insured for the losses to which the insurance relates.
(Citations omitted).
66. E.g., Meritplan Ins. Co. v. Woollum, 52 Cal. App. 3d 167, 170, 123 Cal. Rptr.
613, 615 (1975).
67. Id. at 174, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 618. See also, California State Auto Ass'n Inter-
Ins. Bureau v. Warwick, 17 Cal. 3d 190, 194-95, 550 P.2d 1056, 1059, 130 Cal. Rptr.
520, 523 (court notes the difference between a policy using the term "the" insured as
opposed to "any" insured and holds the latter is unambiguous).
68. Raulet v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. of Milwaukee, 157 Cal. 213, 230, 107 P.
292, 298 (1910) ("It is a matter almost of common knowledge that a very small percent-
age of policy-holders are actually cognizant of the provisions of their policies . . ."), see
also Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 879, 377 P.2d 284, 294, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 172, 183 (1962); Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 272, 419 P.2d 168, 182,
54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 109 (1966).
69. See supra note 1.
70. Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.. 58 Cal. 2d 862, 878, 377 P.2d 284, 294, 27
Cal. Rptr. 172, 182 (1962); Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 271, 419 P.2d 168,
172, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 108 (1966). See also Ponder v. Blue Cross of So. Cal., 145 Cal.
App. 3d 709, 719, 193 Cal. Rptr. 632, 637 (1983) in which the court transformed this
traditional test into a two-tiered approach:
We have chosen to divide the traditional statement of the requirement that in-
surance policy exclusions be "conspicuous, plain and clear" into separate tests.
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whether this standard has been satisfied, courts attempt to measure
and protect the buyer's "reasonable expectations. 7
The reasonable expectation principle establishes a means for inter-
preting insurance contracts to protect the typical unwary consumer,
and could be used by the California Supreme Court to strike down
family exclusion clauses in homeowner policies. Nevertheless, courts
have so far been unwilling to nullify these clauses on this basis.7
2
This judicial unwillingness is confusing. It appears problematic to
conclude that the ordinary, reasonable consumer who purchases an
insurance policy expects that an exclusion clause will deny indemnity
if one family member were injured by the negligent acts of an-
other.7 3 In purchasing the policy, who more than family members
does an insured expect and desire to protect? Indeed, this is the very
protection which the insurance industry purports to offer.
7 4
Faced with these exclusions, families must look to the courts for
protection and relief from deceptive insurance industry practices
such as the family exclusion clauses, which weave a web of exclusion
behind the general policy language of protection and indemnity.7 5
As a matter of logic, this brief clause imposes two very different demands on
those who draft insurance policies. First, the exclusion must be positioned in a
place and printed in a form which would attract a reader's attention. Secondly,
the substance of the exclusion must be stated in words that convey the proper
meaning to persons expected to read the contract.
71. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 271, 419 P.2d 168, 172, 54 Cal. Rptr.
104, 108 (1966). See also Coast Mut. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Security Title Ins. & Guar.
Co., 14 Cal. App. 2d 225, 229, 57 P.2d 1392, 1393 (1936): "Not only the provisions of
the policy as a whole, but also the exceptions to the liability of the insurer, must be
construed so as to give the insured the protection which he reasonably had a right to
expect . .. ."
72. State Farm Fire & Ins. Casualty Co. v. Alstadt, 113 Cal. App. 3d 33, 38, 169
Cal. Rptr. 593, 595 (1980).
73. To assume that a consumer purchases an insurance policy with the reasonable
expectation that the policy will not apply to injuries involving the negligence of one fam-
ily member upon another is suspect. Instead, the insured ordinarily expects their family
to be in Allstate's "Good Hands," to "Get a Piece of the Rock," or proclaim "Aetna, I'm
glad I Metcha." Such advertisements, as well as the broad policy language at the begin-
ning of each policy, lead the insured to reasonably expect adequate, substantial coverage
from carriers who are reliable and dependable, particularly when the insured experiences
a compensable loss.
74. Id.
75. Historically, the insurance industry has been poorly regulated. See, e.g., JOINT
LEGISLATURE AUDIT COMMITTEE, REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE: REVIEW
OF THE DISCIPLINARY FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, Summary 1
(1977). Powerful insurance lobbies are undoubtedly largely responsible for the lack of
regulation in this field. The courts provide a unique forum to control the insurance indus-
try. Bad faith, for example, is an area of law which courts developed to regulate the
insurance industry. Additionally, the imposition of punitive damages helps control abuses
in the insurance practice. See generally Levine, Demonstrating and Preserving the Deter-
The California Supreme Court should implement principles of adhe-
sion contract law to eliminate these unconscionable provisions in
homeowner policies.
A final possible source of help in abrogating family exclusion
clauses in homeowner policies arises from the fiduciary nature of the
insurance relationship. California courts view the relationship be-
tween the insurance carrier and the insured to be fiduciary.76 This
suggests that an insurer is under a duty to notify the insured of the
general provisions in an insurance policy, including any basic
exclusions."
Some jurisdictions require an insurance company to establish that
actual notice of an exclusionary clause was given to an insured, even
where the policy language is clear and unambiguous, before the pro-
vision will be enforced.78 Thus, the carrier cannot merely rely on an
exclusion clause hidden in the policy, but must demonstrate that the
insured knew of the exclusion and had it explained before purchasing
the policy.7
'9
Without providing information to the customer, the insurer not
only violates its fiduciary duty, but may be acting surreptitiously and
in bad faith.8 0 The use of family exclusion clauses demonstrates an
attempt by carriers at the very inception of the relationship to sur-
reptitiously deny important coverage to the insured through uncon-
rent Effect of Punitive Damages in Insurance Bad Faith Actions. 13 U.S.F.L. REV. 613
(1979) (discussing the need for punitive damages and their regulatory function).
76. See, e.g., Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 820, 598 P.2d
452, 457, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482, 487 (1979); Spindle v. Chubb/Pacific Indem. Group, 89
Cal. App. 3d 706, 712, 152 Cal. Rptr. 776, 780 (1979); see also Goodman & Seaton,
Foreword: Ripe for Decision, Internal Workings and Current Concerns of the California
Supreme Court, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 309, 346-47 (1974).
77. Since the insurance relationship is a fiduciary one, with the corresponding trust
and confidence, the concurring duty to inform the insured of the provisions within a
policy would seem logical. However, no decisions have yet established this duty. Never-
theless, a California court established liability for insurers who fail to inform policy hold-
ers of the provisions in their policies, basing the duty to inform on the disparity of knowl-
edge between the parties concerning the policy. See Westrick v. State Farm Ins., 137
Cal. App. 3d 685, 691-92, 187 Cal. Rptr. 214, 218-19 (1982) "A long line of California
cases has recognized that a disparity of knowledge may impose an affirmative duty of
disclosure.
We find no reason to distinguish between the misfeasance of giving erroneous informa-
tion and the nonfeasance of giving no information at all." See also supra note 68 and
accompanying text for discussion regarding the fact that few policy-holders actually are
aware of the provisions within their policy.
78. Cornwell v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 527 F. Supp. 310, 313 (E.D. Pa.
1981).
79. Id.
80. See supra note 4. It may be argued that by failing to inform policyholders
about family exclusion clauses, an insurance company breaches the implied convenant of
good faith and fair dealing since these exclusions drastically reduce the actual coverage
purported in the insuring clause.
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scionable provisions.8' Perhaps such provisions can be struck down
through combining the bad faith guidelines developed in California
with principles of adhesion contract.82
CONCLUSION
Family exclusion clauses are widely used in California. Insurance
companies use such clauses to avoid financial responsibility for inju-
ries to innocent tort victims. Moreover, these provisions are grossly
repugnant to the tort principles and public policy which the Califor-
nia Supreme Court has propounded over the last twenty years.
There is no justification for these exclusionary provisions.83 The
California Supreme Court should abolish family exclusionary clauses
in homeowner policies as being in violation of public policy. These
clauses are inconsistent with the abrogation of intrafamily immunity,
and the recognized tort principles of loss distribution and compensa-
tion. Furthermore, the court can rely on adhesion contract principles
such as unconscionability, as well as the doctrine of bad faith, to
strike down intrafamily exclusion clauses, rather than using simply a
public policy argument.
The Legislature must act in order to eliminate family exclusion
clauses in automobile policies. California Insurance Code section
11580.1, which permits certain family exclusions, is inconsistent with
other laws in this state, and merely benefits insurance companies.
The Legislature should reconsider the policy of affording compensa-
tion to injured motorists, as expressed in the Financial Responsibility
Laws, 84 and prohibit family exclusion clauses in all automobile poli-
cies issued in California.
Only a complete elimination of family exclusion clauses will guar-
antee actual compensation for accident victims who are injured by
81. Despite the fiduciary obligations of an insurer, and the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, insurers use adhesionary family exclusion clauses to evade
their legal duties and obligations such as indemnity.
82. See supra notes 4, 81, and accompanying text. See also Tunkl v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 96, 383 P.2d 441, 443, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 35 (1963) (excul-
patory provisions are permissible only if they do not involve "the public interest"). If
family exclusion clauses are struck down as unconscionable and against public policy,
insurers using them could be held liable for wrongfully withholding benefits to their in-
sureds in bad faith. See, e.g., Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 818-
19, 598 P.2d 452, 456, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482, 486 (1979).
83. See supra note 48.
84. California Vehicle Code sections 16000-16560, the Financial Responsibility
Laws, indicate legislative concern for automobile liability coverage and the corresponding
compensation which insurance guarantees. CAL. VEH. CODE §§16000-16560 (West 1971
& Supp. 1983). Family exclusion clauses contravene this important legislative policy.
the negligence of their own family members. Without necessary leg-
islative and judicial action, the insurance industry will continue dic-
tating the tort law in this state, while the courts merely express
hollow and ineffectual legal philosophy.
TIMOTHY G. FIELDEN
